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Abstract
This paper extends the user-cost approach of Hancock (1985, 1991) in two
ways. First, our model allows nancial rms to behave strategically as well as
competitively. Second, we do not assume that nancial rms are risk-neutral.
Our main object is to derive the index of the degree of competition under
dynamic uncertainty using this extended model. In our model, the classi-
cation of nancial goods into inputs and outputs is always consistent with
the classication based on the sign of each of the partial derivatives of the
variable cost function with respect to nancial goods.
1 Introduction
The user-cost approach has been used to determine whether a nancial prod-
uct is an input or an output on the basis of its net contribution to the rev-
enues of the nancial institution (Hancock, 1985, 1991).1 This approach has
found wide-ranging application and has been applied mainly to measuring
e¢ ciency, productivity, economies of scale, and economies of scope in the
nancial industry without assuming a priori that loans are outputs and de-
posits are inputs (Hancock, 1991). Homma et al. (1996) were the rst to
apply the user-cost method to the Japanese banking industry, and they es-
timated a stochastic prot frontier function for panel data during the High
Growth Era. Ōmori and Nakajima (2000) estimated total factor productivity
and economies of scope in the Japanese banking industry using data from
1987 to 1995. Other papers applied this approach to measure the value of -
nancial services in the national income accounts (Fixler and Zieschang, 1991,
1992). Nagano (2001) and Utsunomiya (2002) measured the nominal value
of nancial services in Japan using this approach. No one has applied this
approach to measure the degree of competition in nancial services.
Although the user-cost approach has the advantage of an unambiguous
classication of nancial goods into inputs and outputs based on the sign
of each of the user-cost prices, this classication is not always consistent
with the classication based on the sign of each of the partial derivatives
of the variable cost function with respect to nancial goods. In addition,
for Hancocks user-cost prices to provide meaningful estimates of prices of
nancial goods, strong assumptions must be maintained, including a risk-
neutral attitude of the nancial rm, competitive markets for nancial goods,
and informational symmetry between buyers and sellers. As a consequence, if
any of these assumptions is violated, the price measures based on Hancocks
user-cost prices will yield biased estimates of prices of nancial goods, and
the classication of nancial goods into inputs and outputs will be incorrect.
In the light of these problems, in this paper, we derive generalizations
1Three principal approaches have been used to measure outputs in the nancial services
sector: the asset or intermediation approach, the user-cost approach, and the value-added
approach (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992).
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of Hancocks user-cost prices. The rst generalization is the stochastic user-
revenue price that does not assume the nancial rms attitude toward risk
to be neutral. This price allows us to consider the case that the attitude
toward risk is averse or loving. The second generalization is the conjectural
user-revenue price that does not assume that the nancial goods markets
are competitive nor that there is informational symmetry between buyers
and sellers in addition to the assumption of a risk-neutral attitude of the
nancial rm. Using this price, we can take into account the case that
nancial rms are strategically interdependent and there are informational
asymmetries between buyers and sellers that lead to adverse selection. The
relation between the stochastic and conjectural user-revenue prices is used
to generalize the Lerner index of monopoly power to the nancial rms
oligopoly under dynamic uncertainty.
Barnett and Zhou (1994) and Barnett et al. (1995) were the rst to
analyze the user-cost approach under dynamic uncertainty. This is likely to
lead to generalizations similar to analysis of the stochastic user-revenue price.
Unfortunately, their purpose is the pursuit of more desirable monetary ag-
gregation, and thus they not only do not derive a generalized user-cost price
such as the stochastic user-revenue price but also do not consider the case
where nancial rms are strategically interdependent and there are informa-
tional asymmetries between buyers and sellers. Furthermore, the formulation
of the dynamic-uncertainty model in their papers is less rigorous in terms of
the stochastic properties of the exogenous state variables than in this paper.
The contribution we make in this paper is, therefore, signicant.
The ultimate purpose of this paper is to derive an index of the degree
of competition in the nancial industry by using the generalized user-cost
approach. There are some papers using other approaches that estimate rst-
order conditions for prot-maximizing oligopolies to measure the degree of
competition and collusion in Japanese nancial industries.2 Souma and Tsut-
sui (2000) examined a change in the level of competition in the Japanese life
insurance industry for the period 19861997 using the asset approach and
2The asset or intermediation approach treats nancial service rms as pure nancial
intermediaries that borrow funds and transform the resulting liabilities into assets.
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found that the industry was not very competitive but became more com-
petitive from 1995 when the New Insurance Industry Law came into force.
Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) applied an asset approach, similar to that of
Souma and Tsutsui (2000), to the Japanese banking industry and estimated
the degree of competition from 1974 to 2000. They found that the market
had become more competitive in the 1970s, and judged that the Japanese
banking sector faced perfect competition by the middle of the 1990s. By
using the H-statistic, Kamesaka and Tsutsui (2002) found that the Japanese
securities industry was in monopoly equilibrium in the 1980s and in monop-
olistic competition equilibrium in the 1990s.
In sections 2.12.5, we generalize the Hancock (1985, 1991) user-cost ap-
proach. In section 2.6, using this generalized model, we derive the stochastic
and conjectural user-revenue price and our index of the degree of competi-
tion in the nancial industry. In section 3, we sketch the empirical research
procedure based on this model. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Specication
Throughout this section, we assume that time is divided into discrete peri-
ods. The periods are su¢ ciently short that variations in exogenous (state)
variables within the period can be neglected. The exogenous variables remain
constant within each period, but can change discretely at the boundaries of
periods. The process of adjustment is essentially instantaneous so that we
can ignore stock adjustment problems.
2.1 Net Cash Flow
All nancial transactions are assumed to take place at the boundaries be-
tween intervals. Each nancial rm holds an inventory consisting of stocks
of nancial assets and liabilities during each time period. We note that the
net cash ow of a nancial rm includes the cost or revenue of holding this
inventory no less importantly than the cost of real resource inputs.
Let pG;t be the general price index in period t, which is used to deate
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nominal units to real. Let qi;j;t be the real balance of the jth nancial good
of the ith rm and hi;j;t be the holding cost, or revenue per yen, where
j = 1;   ; NA for assets, and j = NA+1;   ; NA+NL for liabilities. Holding
costs or revenues are contracted at the beginning of each period, but paid or
received at the end of the period.
The net cash ow produced by nancial good j during period t is
qNCFi;j;t = bj  (hi;j;t 1  pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1 + pG;t 1  qi;j;t 1   pG;t  qi;j;t) ; (1)
where bj = 1 if the nancial good is an asset, j = 1;   ; NA, and bj =  1 if
the nancial good is a liability, j = NA + 1;   ; NA +NL. In the case of an
asset such as a loan, with the exception of cash, the rst term in equation
(1) is holding revenues and the last two terms represent the change in the
nominal asset. This change is positive (or negative) if principal payments
from borrowers are larger (or smaller) than new loans. These terms represent
the net cash ow from employing an asset. What has to be noticed is that
the holding revenue of cash, hi;1;t, is zero because the holding of cash which is
the rst asset, j = 1, does not yield revenue. On a liability such as a deposit,
the rst term is holding cost and the last two terms represent the nominal
liability change, which is positive if new deposits are larger than withdrawals.
These terms represent the net cash ow from issuing a liability.
2.2 Endogenous Holding Revenue or Cost
Holding revenue is the net revenue generated from holding an asset per time
period. Net revenue is dened to equal default losses subtracted from the
sum of interest revenues, service charges, and capital gains or losses. Interest
revenue is the sum of collected and uncollected interest. The amount of
uncollected interest is interpreted as one measure of asset quality. The service
charge includes late loan payments and stand-by charges. The default loss
includes assets marked down or written o¤, interest payments forgiven, and
collection costs.
We assume that there is oligopolistic interdependence among nancial
rms and informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders that
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lead to adverse selection, so that the components of holding revenue are de-
termined endogenously. For example, the prime determinants of loan interest
revenue are the total of loans in the market, institutional interest rate, credit
risk, and the nancial condition of borrowers.
Let ri;j;t denote the collected interest rate of the jth asset of the ith
nancial rm in period t, rQi;j;t the uncollected interest rate, h
S
i;j;t the ser-
vice charge rate, hCi;j;t capital gains or losses, h
D
i;j;t the default rate, Qj;t
the total assets in the market, zki;j;t (k = R;Q; S;D) the vectors of exoge-













. The holding revenue per yen for the ith
nancial rms jth asset in period t is represented by






































; for j = 1;   ; NA: (2)
Note that capital gains or losses hCi;j;t are assumed to be determined exoge-
nously.
Holding cost is the net cost of holding a liability per time period. The
net cost is dened as the sum of interest payments, insurance premiums, and
an implicit reserve tax, less service charges. The interest payment is the sum
of paid and unpaid interest. The amount of unpaid interest is regarded as a
measure of liability quality. Consider a deposit. An average deposit yields
service charges per time period from depositors. The nancial rm, on the
other hand, pays interest on deposits, deposit insurance premiums, and the
implicit tax imposed by the reserve requirement. The reserve requirement
is a tax because it requires nancial rms to hold deposits that do not bear
interest with their central bank. The tax is the forgone interest on uninvested
required reserves. With respect to bond obligations or borrowed funds, insur-
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ance premiums and the implicit reserve tax are zero because these liabilities
are not subject to insurance premiums or reserve requirements.
As for holding cost, the components of holding cost are assumed to be
determined endogenously because of oligopolistic interdependence among -
nancial rms and informational asymmetries between depositors and nancial
rms. For instance, the deposit interest payment depends on total deposits
in the market, the default risk of the nancial rm, the current wealth of
depositors, and their expectation of future wealth.
Let ri;j;t be the paid interest rate of the jth liability of the ith nancial
rm in period t, rQi;j;t the unpaid interest rate, h
I
i;j;t the insurance premium
rate, hSi;j;t the service charge rate, r
D
i;t the subjective rate of time preference,
i;j;t the required reserve ratio, Qj;t the total liabilities in the market, zki;j;t
(k = R;Q; I; S) the vectors of exogenous (state) variables a¤ecting each













holding cost per yen for the ith nancial rms jth liability in period t is
given by






































; for j = NA + 1;   ; NA +NL: (3)
Note that rDi;t  i;j;t means the implicit tax rate imposed by the reserve re-
quirement and is assumed to be determined exogenously.
2.3 Production Technology
Let qi;t = (qi;1;t;   ; qi;NA+NL;t)
0 denote the vector of real balances of nancial
goods of the ith nancial rm in period t, xi;t = (xi;1;t;   ; xi;M;t)0 the vector
of real resource inputs such as labor, physical capital, and materials, zQi;t =
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the vector of exogenous (state) variables a¤ecting the
quality of nancial goods, and  i;t an index of (exogenous) technical change.
We assume that the e¢ cient production technology of the ith nancial rm








The important point to note is that some elements of the real balance vec-
tor qi;t can be outputs or inputs, but all of them cannot be inputs. The trans-
formation function i satises the appropriate regularity conditions. That
is, i is strictly convex in (qi;t;xi;t) and @i /@qi;j;t > 0 if qi;j;t is an output,
@i /@qi;j;t < 0 if qi;j;t is an input, and @i /@xi;j;t < 0, since xi;t is an input
vector.
Taking the intertemporal optimization problem of nancial rms into
consideration, some inputs are optimized, and others remain constant within
a single period. The former are variable inputs and the latter are xed (or
quasi-xed) ones. Let xVi;t =
 
xVi;1;t;   ; xVi;MV ;t
0
be the vector of the real
resource variable inputs, such as labor and materials, of the ith nancial
rm in period t, pVi;t =
 
pVi;1;t;   ; pVi;MV ;t
0
the vector of variable input prices,
and xFi;t =
 
xFi;1;t;   ; xFi;MF ;t
0
the vector of real resource xed inputs such as
physical capital and human capital.
As far as a single period is concerned, we assume that the nancial rm
takes variable input prices as given and minimizes variable cost with respect
to variable inputs subject to equation (4). Consequently, the following vari-














i qi;t;xi;t; zQi;t;  i;t = 0o :
(5)
It is important to note that some elements of the real balance vector qi;t can
be outputs or xed inputs, but all of them cannot be xed inputs.
Let qOi;t =
 
qOi;1;t;   ; qOi;NO;t
0
denote the output vector of real balances of
the ith nancial rm in period t and let qFi;t =
 
qFi;1;t;   ; qFi;NF ;t
0
be the xed-
input vector. Both vectors include all elements of qi;t. Because of duality
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between transformation functions and variable cost functions, the variable




i;t, strictly decreasing in x
F
i;t
and qFi;t, and homogeneous of degree one and strictly concave in p
V
i;t. Added
to these conditions, we assume that CVi is twice continuously di¤erentiable
in all its arguments and strictly convex in qi;t and xFi;t because the analysis
below needs these assumptions.
Now, consider the jth real resource stock of the ith nancial rm at time
t, xFi;j;t. Let Ii;j;t denote gross investment and let i;j;t be the depreciation
rate. We assume that gross investment becomes productive instantaneously
and the adjustment cost associated with installing capital is zero. The depre-
ciation rate i;j;t is constant and assumed to be given. Capital accumulation
is given by
xFi;j;t = Ii;j;t + (1  i;j;t)  xFi;j;t 1, for j = 1;   ;MF . (6)
2.4 Prot and Utility
The nancial rm receives a prot, namely, a return on a nancial undertak-
ing after all operating expenses have been met. The prot of the ith nancial










































xFi;j;t   (1  i;j;t)  xFi;j;t 1

, (7)
where pFi;j;t (j = 1;   ;MF ) are the prices of real resource xed inputs. The
rst term in this equation, which is the sum of net cash ows, represents the
total net revenue of nancial goods. The second term is the variable cost of
real resource variable inputs and the last term represents total expenditure on
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investments. We note that prot, as dened here, is neither exactly variable
nor short-run prot in a conventional static model. It is essential for the
denition of variable or short-run prot to specify the prices of nancial goods
and real resource xed inputs. We dene these prices below, as generalized
user-cost prices.
To deal explicitly with the attitude to risk of a nancial rm, we use a
utility function describing the nancial rms preferences over prots dened
by equation (7). The utility function of the ith nancial rm during period
t is given by ui (i;t). We assume that the utility function ui is strictly
increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and strictly concave in i;t.
2.5 Dynamic Uncertainty Behavior
Since nancial goods and real resource xed inputs, both measured by stocks,
are assumed to be held during each period, but change discretely at the
boundaries of periods, their adjustment to optimal levels requires at least
two periods. In an intertemporal decision, some risk, which may be dened
as reductions in rm value due to changes in the business environment, is
hardly avoidable. In this section, we model a nancial rms decision as a
stochastic dynamic programming problem.
There are two specications of the problem between which the important
di¤erence is in the relative timing of each decision-making period and the
realization of uncertainty. In the rst case, the decision is made after the
uncertainty is realized, so that in each period the decision maker chooses
directly the next periods state variable. In the second case, the decision is
made before the uncertainty is realized, so that the decision maker chooses
the current periods control variable, and the next periods state variable is a
function of that variable and the current state variable. Since the adjustment
cost of stock variables is assumed to be zero and more reliable information on
the decision leads to rises in rm value, we assume the rst case, in which the
nancial rms decision is made at the end of the period after the uncertainty
is realized, so that the nancial rm chooses the next periods state variable
directly.
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The state variables are classied into the endogenous state variables and








qi;1;t;   ; qi;NA+NL;t; xFi;1;t;   ; xFi;MF ;t
0











(t  0) denote the vectors of the ex-

























(t  0) for j =
NA + 1;   ; NA +NL, zHi;t 1 =
 
zH0i;1;t 1;   ; zH0i;NA+NL;t 1
0











. Let zCi;t =

pV 0i;t ; z
Q0
i;t ;  i;t
0
(t  0)
be the vectors of the exogenous state variables with respect to the vari-
able cost function, where zQi;t =





(t  0). Let zi;t = 








(t  1) be their vectors with respect to prot











with respect to prot in period 0.
We assume that the stochastic process fzi;tgt0 follows a stationaryMarkov
process. Let (Z;BZ) be a measurable space, where Z is a set of zi;t and
BZ is a -algebra of its subsets. The stochastic properties of the exoge-
nous state variables are represented by the stationary transition function,
Q : Z BZ ! [0; 1].3 The interpretation is that Q (zi;t; Ai;t+1) is the proba-
bility that the next periods state lies in the set Ai;t+1, given that the current




= (Z      Z;BZ     BZ), (t times) denote
the product space and let zi;0 2 Z be given. We dene probability measures
t (zi;0;  ) : BtZ ! [0; 1], t = 1; 2;   , on these spaces as follows.4 For any















Q (zi;t 1;dzi;t)Q (zi;t 2;dzi;t 1)Q (zi;0;dzi;1)
(8)
The probability measure t (zi;0;  ) satises the properties of measures and
t (zi;0; Z
t) = 1.
The decision to be carried out in period t can depend upon the informa-
3For further details of the stationary transition function, see Stokey and Lucas (1989:
p.212).
4See Stokey and Lucas (1989: pp.220-225) for a full account of the probability measures.
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tion that will be available at that time. This information is the sequence
of the vectors of the exogenous state variables. Let zti = (zi;1;   ; zi;t) 2 Zt
denote their partial history in period 1 through t. Let (Y;BY ) be a measur-
able space, where Y is a set of the vectors of the endogenous state variables
yi;t and BY is a -algebra of its subsets. We dene a plan y
p
i as the set
of a value ypi;0 2 Y and a sequence of functions y
p
i;t : Z












00 is the value for yi;t+1 =  q0i;t+1;xF 0i;t+10
that will be chosen in period t if the partial history of the exogenous state
variables in period 1 through t is zti.
The nancial rm is assumed to choose this plan to maximize the expected
value of the discounted inter-temporal utility of its prots stream. We also
assume that the inter-temporal utility function is additively separable. The
















































is the cumulative discount factor and
rDi;s is the subjective rate of time preference.






























































































For stochastic optimization problems in sequence form, necessary con-
ditions for an optimum can be derived by a variational approach. These
conditions are called stochastic Euler equations. The stochastic Euler equa-
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











Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0,












pFi;j;t+1  (1  i;j;t+1) 
@ui;t+1
@i;t+1
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0,










  i;t  pG;t 
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Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0,
j = NA + 1;   ; NA +NL, (14)
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i)(j = 2;   ; NA) the optimal levels
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NA + 1;   ; NA +NL) the optimal levels of liabilities.







and ypi;t, and integrable, and if each of the partial
derivatives of ui;t with respect to y
p
i;t 1 is absolutely integrable, then the sto-










ypi;j;tQ (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0, j = 1;   ; NA+NL+MF ,
(15)













2.6 Conjectural User-Revenue Price
The user-cost prices of nancial goods presented by Hancock (1985, 1991)
have the advantage of the unambiguous classication of nancial goods into
inputs and outputs based on the sign of each of the user-cost prices. However,
this classication is not always consistent with the classication based on the
sign of each of the partial derivatives of the variable cost function with respect
to nancial goods. In addition, for Hancocks user-cost prices to provide
meaningful estimates of prices of nancial goods, strong assumptions must
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be maintained. In particular, it is necessary to assume that the nancial
rms attitude to risk is neutral, that nancial goods markets are competitive,
and that there is informational symmetry between buyers and sellers. The
last two assumptions imply that the rates of holding revenues (or costs) are
given. As a consequence, if any of these assumptions is violated, the price
measures based on Hancocks user-cost prices will yield biased estimates of
prices of nancial goods, and the classication of nancial goods into inputs
and outputs will be incorrect.
In the light of these problems, we derive generalizations of Hancocks
user-cost prices. Rearranging the stochastic Euler equations (12) and (14)








1 + bC 
 









= bj  pG;t 













Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) , and





1 (j = 1;   ; NA) ,
 1 (j = NA + 1;   ; NA +NL) ,
bC =
(
0 (j = 1) ,












































The parameter bj distinguishes assets from liabilities, and bC identies cash.
si;j;t is the ith nancial rms market share of the jth nancial good in period
t. i;j;t is the negative elasticity of the rate of the ith nancial rms holding
revenue (or cost) with respect to the logarithm of the quantity of the jth
nancial good in the market in period t. CVi;j;t is the conjectural derivative,
which is the way the ith nancial rm thinks all other rmsjth nancial
good changes as the ith nancial rms jth nancial good changes in period
t.
We, then, dene generalizations of Hancocks user-cost prices as follows:
pSURi;j;t = bj  pG;t 








= bj  pG;t 

Si;t  (1 + bC  hi;j;t)  1
	
, j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (17)
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1 + bC 
 













1 + bC 
 




= pSURi;j;t   i;j;t, j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (18)
where






j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (19a)
i;j;t = bj  bC  pG;t  Si;t  si;j;t  i;j;t  (1 + CVi;j;t) ,
j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (19b)
The rst price pSURi;j;t is the stochastic user-revenue price of the jth nancial
good of the ith nancial rm in period t, which contains Hancocks user-cost
price as a special case because the nancial rms attitude toward risk is not






= 1, so that
pSURi;j;t = bj pG;t 

i;t  (1 + bC  hi;j;t)  1

=  bj pG;t 
rDi;t   bC  hi;j;t
1 + rDi;t
; that is,
the stochastic user-revenue price equals Hancocks negative user-cost price.
The stochastic user-revenue price allows us to think about the case of the
risk-averse nancial rm.
The second price pCURi;j;t is the conjectural user-revenue price of the jth
nancial good of the ith nancial rm in period t, which is more general
than the stochastic user-revenue price pSURi;j;t because it is not assumed that
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the nancial goods markets are competitive and that there is informational
symmetry between buyers and sellers. If the jth nancial good market is
competitive, then CVi;j;t =  1, so that pCURi;j;t = pSURi;j;t ; that is, the conjectural
user-revenue price equals the stochastic user-revenue price. In addition to
the case of the risk-averse nancial rm, the conjectural user-revenue price
allows us to consider the case that the nancial rms are strategically in-
terdependent and that there are informational asymmetries between buyers
and sellers that lead to adverse selection. From equations (16) and (18),
furthermore, we obtain the following equations:
@CVi;t
@qpi;j;t
= pCURi;j;t = p
SUR
i;j;t   i;j;t, j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (20)
Equations (20) mean that the classication of nancial goods into inputs
and outputs based on the sign of each of the conjectural user-revenue prices
is consistent with the classication based on the sign of each of the partial
derivatives of the variable cost function with respect to nancial goods. If
the conjectural user-revenue price has a plus (or minus) sign, the partial
derivative of the variable cost function also has a plus (or minus) sign, so
that the nancial good is dened as an output (or xed input).
Using equations (20) with respect to the nancial goods dened as out-









bj  pG;t  Si;t
 1o, 






bC  si;j;t  i;j;t  (1 + CVi;j;t)
	, 




, j = 1; ; NA+NL.
(21)
Equations (21) are generalizations of the Lerner index of monopoly power
of the nancial rmsoligopoly under dynamic uncertainty. If si;j;t = 1 and
CVi;j;t = 0, the ith nancial rm is a monopoly in the jth nancial good
market in period t. If CVi;j;t = 0, the ith nancial rm is a Cournot rm,
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which expects that all other nancial rmsoutputs will not change as its own
output changes. If CVi;j;t =  1, the ith nancial rm is a competitive rm,
whose price-marginal cost margin is zero. Higher values of CVi;j;t correspond
to larger gaps between price and marginal cost and thus to less intense rivalry.
The correspondence between the generalized Lerner index (GLI) and hi;j;t or
Si;t, however, is not clear from the right-hand side of equations (21) because













bj  pG;t 

Si;t  (1 + bC  hi;j;t)  1
	
,
j = 1;   ; NA +NL.
From these equations, under the assumption that the partial derivatives
of the variable cost function are constant, higher values of hi;j;t correspond
to higher values of the GLI if the jth nancial good is an asset (bj = 1),
whereas higher values of hi;j;t correspond to lower values of the GLI if the
jth nancial good is a liability (bj =  1). These ndings are consistent
with our intuition about the relationship between hi;j;t and the degree of
competition. Furthermore, under the same assumption, higher values of Si;t
correspond to higher values of the GLI if the jth nancial good is an asset,
whereas higher values of Si;t correspond to lower values of the GLI if the jth
nancial good is a liability. Since the inverse of Si;t can be interpreted as
the risk-free rate (RFR), according to asset pricing theory, lower values of
the RFR correspond to higher values of the GLI if the jth nancial good is
an asset, whereas lower values of the RFR correspond to lower values of the
GLI if the jth nancial good is a liability.
The concept of conjectural variation is popular in both applied theoretic
and empirical industrial organization. Theorists of industrial organization,
however, take a dim view of its ad hoc assumptions about the conduct of
6For example, if hi;j;t in equation (3) or 
S
i;t in equation (19a) changes with r
D
i;t, then
qpi;j;t varies. Therefore, si;j;t, i;j;t, and CVi;j;t in the numerator of the right-hand side of
equations (21) will also change.
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rms, its lack of a game-theoretic foundation, and the forcing of dynamics
into an essentially static model with the strategy space and the time horizon
of the underlying game only loosely dened (cf. Fellner, 1949; Friedman,
1983, p.110; Daughety, 1985; Makowski, 1987; Tirole, 1989, pp. 244245).
These shortcomings are often perceived as the cost that the modeler must pay
for realism without compromising simplicity and tractability. However, it is
fortunate that Dockner (1992), Cabral (1995), and Pfa¤ermayr (1999) show
that the concept of conjectural variation can be supported by a consistent
theoretical foundation, if it is considered to be a reduced form of a dynamic
game.7 Their ndings can be used to justify a static conjectural variations
analysis for both modeling dynamic interactions and estimating the degree
of oligopoly power. From the same viewpoint as theirs, we believe that the
use of the conjectural user-revenue model is rationalized by considering it as
a reduced form of an (unmodeled) dynamic game.
3 Empirical Sketch
A theoretical extension is not the only contribution of the conjectural user-
revenue model (CURM) described in the last section. The CURM could also
give a basis for future empirical research. To realize this contribution, we
sketch an empirical research procedure based on the CURM.
3.1 Empirical Specication
In order to estimate the CURM, we need to specify the variable cost function
dened by (5) and the utility function described in section 2.4. The subjective
7Using an innite horizon adjustment cost model, Dockner (1992) demonstrates that
any steady state closed-loop (subgame-perfect) equilibrium coincides with a static con-
jectural variation equilibrium with nonzero conjectures. Cabral (1995) proves that, in
linear oligopolies and for an open set of values of the discount factor, there exists an exact
correspondence between the conjectural variation solution and the solution of quantity-
setting repeated game with minimax punishments during T periods. Pfa¤ermayr (1999)
follows an idea put forward by Cabral (1995) and demonstrates that the conjectural vari-
ation model can be interpreted as the joint-prot-maximizing steady-state reduced form
of a price-setting supergame in a di¤erentiated product market under optimal punishment
strategies.
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rate of time preference found in (9) is also specied if it is estimated. A point
duly to be considered in specifying the variable cost function is the argument
between the calibration and the exible functional approach put forward by
Lau (1978), Diewert and Wales (1988), and Barnett et al. (1991). They
point out that the former approach uses very restrictive specications for
tastes and technology, whereas the latter approach cannot be implemented
using time-series data if the model has a large number of goods.
Taking into account this argument, Diewert and Wales (1988) proposed
the concept of a semiexible form, which is a special case of a exible form
but which requires fewer free parameters. While this concept is only one
possible parametric specication, Barnett et al. (1991) asserted that a gen-
eral modeling approach that meets the following requirements is needed. (1)
Such an approach must be able to incorporate as much theoretical exibility
as can be supported by the available sample size, so that the depth of the
parameterization must be dependent upon sample size. (2) The approach
must be able to impose the economic theory that it supports globally. (3) It-
erative estimation algorithms capable of producing inferences having known
properties must exist.
Is the rst requirement compatible with the second one? The answer
is: yes, under di¢ cult and limited conditions. Although some sophisticated
models proposed by Diewert and Wales (1987, 1988), Barnett et al. (1991),
and Barnett and Hahm (1994) do make it possible, the estimation of these
models is not easy because the second requirement imposes highly nonlin-
ear restrictions on estimation parameters. In specifying the variable cost
function, these arguments should be borne in mind.
In specifying the utility function, we need to take into consideration a
restriction on the specication stemming from the dynamic model. In the
static model assuming the single period optimization, the indirect utility
function or the expenditure function would be estimated by applying duality
theory.8 In the CURM, however, it is di¢ cult to derive the same function
because the CURM is a dynamic-uncertainty model. For this reason, we must
estimate parameters of the utility function indirectly through the stochastic
8See, for example, Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995).
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Euler equations described by (12), (13), and (14). Unlike the specication
of the variable cost function assuming direct estimation, the specication
of the utility function, which does not have a directly estimated equation,
is forced to keep the parameterization to a requisite minimum. Although
a very general specication of the utility function to represent risk is the
hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) class, feasible specications may
include Box-Cox, quadratic, power, and logarithmic function.9
3.2 Estimation Procedure
The CURM can be estimated using the stochastic Euler equations (12) to
(14). For more e¢ cient estimates, however, we hope to estimate the variable
cost function, (5), and/or the short-run derived demand function simulta-
neously in addition to these equations. In estimating these equations and
functions simultaneously, the rst consideration is that all these include en-
dogenous state variables as explanatory variables. These explanatory vari-
ables, therefore, correlate with error terms of each equation and function.
This causes nonlinear least squares estimates to be inconsistent.10
Classifying roughly, there are two procedures to resolve this problem. One
procedure is the nonlinear maximum likelihood (NLML) procedure includ-
ing the Jacobian factor, and another is the nonlinear instrumental variable
(NLIV) procedure. The former procedure is familiar as the nonlinear full-
information maximum likelihood (NLFIML) procedure.11 The latter is well
known as the nonlinear three-stage least squares (NL3SLS) procedure and the
generalized method of moment (GMM) procedure.12 In theory, the NL3SLS
procedure is a special case of the GMM procedure because the estimators
of both procedures are coincident under serial independence and conditional
homoscedasticity in the errors.13
Which of these procedures is chosen depends on whether the estimated
9For further details of HARA, see Ingersoll (1987, pp.3740).
10On this problem, see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp.211215).
11See, for example, Amemiya (1985, Chapter 8) and Gallant (1987, Chapter 6).
12See, for example, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, Chapters 7, 17, 18).
13See, for example, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp.651667).
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equations or functions are linear in the endogenous state variables. If linear,
the NLFIML procedure is consistent, even if the error terms are not, in
fact, distributed as multivariate normal, and asymptotically equivalent to
the NL3SLS procedure.14 If nonlinear, although the NLFIML procedure will
be more e¢ cient, asymptotically, than the NLIV procedure, the NLFIML
procedure may be inconsistent if the assumption of normality is not met.15
The NLIV procedure, on the other hand, does not need this assumption for
consistency.16 For this reason, if the estimated equations or functions are
nonlinear in the endogenous state variables, in the light of robustness to the
assumption of the distribution of the errors, the NLIV procedure would be
more desirable than the NLFIML procedure. Furthermore, since the GMM
procedure is superior to the NL3SLS procedure under serial correlation and
conditional heteroscedasticity in the errors, the GMM procedure would be
the most desirable procedure. Since the stochastic Euler equations, (12),
(13), and (14), would be in most cases nonlinear in the endogenous state
variables, the GMM procedure should be used to estimate the CURM.
4 Conclusion
We have derived an index of the degree of competition as a generalization
of the Lerner index of monopoly power of nancial rmsoligopoly under
dynamic uncertainty by extending the user-cost approach of Hancock (1985,
1991) in two ways. First, our model allows nancial rms to behave strategi-
cally as well as competitively. Second, we do not assume that nancial rms
are risk-neutral. Although the user-cost approach has been used to deter-
mine whether a nancial product is an input or an output on the basis of its
net contribution to the revenues of the nancial institution, this classication
is not always consistent with the classication based on the sign of each of
the partial derivatives of the variable cost function with respect to nancial
14See Amemiya (1977).
15See Amemiya (1977), White (1982), Phillips (1982), Hausman (1983, p.444), and
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p.667).
16See Amemiya (1977), Hausman (1983, p.444), and Davidson and MacKinnon (1993,
p.667).
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goods. However, our index is consistent with the classication based on the
variable cost function.
Some issues will need to be investigated in future work. First, although
the user-cost approach has been used mainly for the banking industry (we
also derive our model for the banking industry in this paper), we will try to
derive this index of the degree of competition using the user-cost approach
for various nancial institutions like the life insurance industry, the property-
liability insurance industry and the securities industry.17 Second, we need
to estimate our index of the degree of competition. But, as Berger and
Humphrey (1992) pointed out, some applications of the user cost approach
in banking showed that classications of inputs and outputs were not robust
to the choice of opportunity-cost estimates nor were they robust over time.
For this reason, we need to treat the classications of inputs and outputs
with special care when we estimate our model.
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